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Two Ships in the Night or in the Same Boat Together:
How the ECJ Squared the Circle and Foreshadowed
Lisbon in its Kadi Judgment
Abstract: This paper argues that the ECJ in its seminal Kadi judgment made the
right decision and foreshadowed numerous reforms in the EU’s external action in-
troduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It rightly rejected the approach presented by the Court
of First Instance, which ultimately turned out to be a false friend of international law.
By largely following the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court maintained the su-
perior human rights standard of the EU legal order. Without, however, jeopardizing
the compliance of the Member States with their UN obligations right away, it sent a
clear warning signal to the UN Security Council to exhaust the potential for reform
of the targeted sanction regime. The Court showed that in the face of such global
threats as terrorism as well as the undermining of basic human rights, we are all in
the same boat together after all. 
Introduction
The issue of targeted anti-terror sanctions has assumed a prominent place
in scholarly and public debate over the past years. The most drastic state-
ments describe assets freezing and travel bans as ‘a civil death penalty’,1
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1 Quoting Council of Europe Rapporteur Dick Marty in an interview (‘zivile Todesstrafe’),
B.Kruse, Zivile Todesstrafe, “sueddeutsche.de”, 12.11.2007, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik
/dick-marty-bericht-zu-terrorlisten-zivile-todesstrafe-1.344886 (last visited 13.07.2010).
 destroying the livelihood and reputation of the people concerned and thus
turning them into Agambian homines sacri, i.e. outlaws ‘without rights and
no avenue to recover their presence in society’.2 It is further alleged that a
permanent state of emergency in the ‘war against terror’ serves as a ques-
tionable justification for this.3 Especially the way these sanctions are imposed
and maintained at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has kindled
this criticism, often spawning analogies to the works of Franz Kafka, where
the individual usually finds himself helplessly at the mercy of obscure and
inaccessible bureaucratic structures.4
At the core of this highly charged debate we find the case concerning
Yassin Abdullah Kadi, which culminated in the seminal judgment of the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice (ECJ) on 3 September 2008,5 and which has inspired
an immense amount of scholarly work.6 Here, the highest Court of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) was – ‘in a more dramatic way than ever before’7 – ‘con-
fronted with the complexities of a world system of governance established
at three levels, the United Nations (UN) level, represented primarily by the
Security Council, the Community level and lastly the national level’.8 It is
precisely this ‘Mehrebenenproblematik’9 (multi-level problem) which makes
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2 W. Vlcek, Acts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism: Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy at the European Court of Justice, “European Foreign Affairs Review” Vol. 11, No. 4/2006,
p. 506, referring to: G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-
Roazen, Stanford 1998. 
3 See: J. Klabbers, Kadi Justice at the Security Council?, “International Organizations Law
Review” Vol. 4, No. 2/2008, p. 303–304, also drawing on the philosophical considerations of
G. Agamben, State of Exception, trans. K. Attell, Chicago 2005. 
4 See: A. von Arnauld, UN-Sanktionen und gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz: Die
‘Soweit-Rechtsprechung’ des Europäischen Gerichts Erster Instanz (UN Sanctions and Fun-
damental Rights Protection Under Community Law: The ‘as-far-as Jurisprudence’ of the
Court of First Instance), “Archiv des Völkerrechts” Vol. 44, No. 2/2006, p. 211–212; W. Vlcek,
op.cit., p. 507; also I. Ley, Legal Protection Against the UN-Security Council Between Euro-
pean and International Law: A Kafkaesque Situation?, “German Law Journal” Vol. 8, No.
3/2007, p. 279–294.
5 Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415-05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission
[2008] ECR I-06351. The cases on Kadi and Al Barakaat had been joined in the appeals phase.
However, for reasons of conciseness, this paper will refer only to the judgments and the Advo-
cate General’s Opinion as pertaining to Kadi. 
6 For a useful overview see: S. Poli and M. Tzanou, The Kadi Rulings: a Survey of the  Litera -
ture, “Yearbook of European Law” Vol. 28/2009, p. 533–558.
7 C. Tomuschat, European Court of First Instance, judgment of 21 September 2005, “Com-
mon Market Law Review” Vol. 43, No. 2/2006, p. 537.
8 Ibidem.
9 S. Alber, Kurzbesprechung der Schlussanträge des Generalanwalts Poiares Maduro
vom 16.1.2008 (Case Note on the Opinions of Advocate General Poiares Maduro Delivered on
16 January 2008), “Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht” Vol. 19, No. 6/2008, p. 165.
this case a unique counterpoint in legal history,10 i.e. a situation in which
several legal orders apply simultaneously and have to be reconciled so as to
produce harmony instead of discord.11 How difficult this task is has become
apparent in the two starkly divergent approaches presented to the ECJ in the
legal process leading up to its judgment, i.e. the judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI, after Lisbon called the General Court, GC)12 stressing
the primacy of the UN Charter, and the Opinion of Advocate General (AG)
Poiares Maduro,13 stressing the autonomy of the EU legal order. Therefore,
these two approaches represent extremes, each with its respective advan-
tages and disadvantages. It will be argued here that the ECJ’s judgment man-
aged to take the best from both. Furthermore, it anticipated many of the im-
portant changes to EU’s external relations constitutional law introduced
13 months later with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,14 which has
among its principal aims making the EU a more assertive player on the in-
ternational scene.
The paper will proceed as follows: First, the opposing positions taken in
the judgment of the CFI and the AG’s Opinion will be compared and criti-
cally assessed as to how they conceive of the relationship between the EU
and the international legal order. This will be followed by an appraisal of the
ECJ judgment and its aftermath, as well as its foreshadowing of certain im-
portant changes in the law of the EU’s external relations brought about by
the Lisbon Treaty. 
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10 The notion of ‘counterpunctual law’ was coined by Miguel Maduro himself, meaning the
harmonious interplay between the legal orders of the EU Member States and the European Union
itself; see: M. Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in
 Action in: Sovereignty in Transition, ed. N. Walker, Oxford 2003, p. 501–537. In the present
 context, however, it will concern the interplay between the international and the European legal
orders.
11 Referring to the metaphor used by V.Kronenberger, Introduction in: The European Union
and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony?, ed. V.Kronenberger, the Hague 2001,
p. XI-XIV.
12 Case T-315/01 Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-03649.
13 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commis-
sion, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 16.01.2008 [2008] ECR 
I-06351.
14 References in this paper will be made to the Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, i.e.
to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), as well as to the singular legal entity of the EU. References to the Treaties in
force before 1 December 2009 will be to the (post-Nice) old Treaty on European Union (old
TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), including where necessary
reference to the former European Community (EC).
1. Between misapplication and isolation:
Two approaches to solve Kadi
With the ECJ being faced with a unique dilemma on how to deal with the
review of acts that are a one-to-one transposition of Security Council reso-
lutions (so-called ‘non-autonomous sanctions’), the solutions proposed by
the CFI and the AG to solve the dilemma arrived at two completely opposite
conclusions, with their respective lines of reasoning differing considerably.
To grasp this divergence, and to determine the preferable solution in dealing
with the Mehrebenenproblematik, first the judgment of the CFI and  sub -
sequently the Advocate General’s Opinion will be critically scrutinized as to
the implications they have for the relationship between European and inter-
national law.
1.1. The Court of First Instance: A false friend of international law?
In its judgment of 21 September 2005, the CFI trod on new ground con-
cerning the relationship between the EU and UN legal orders, as well as in-
ternational law in general. Its reasoning can de deconstructed in the follow-
ing way: First, the CFI chose as point of departure the UN Charter, which it
considered to have a binding and supreme character over both the Member
States and the EC.15 Consequently, it presented a changed hierarchy of norms
in the (then) EC legal order, granting itself a very limited scope of review
against what it considers to be jus cogens, i.e. peremptory norms of interna-
tional law.16 With a threshold this high, the CFI eventually opined that no
human rights violations could be detected.17 In the following, an apprecia-
tion of the CFI’s reasoning will be made, concluding that the CFI ended up
being a ‘false friend’ of international law, while sacrificing most of the legal
protection offered by the EU legal order. For the purposes of this paper there
are three main remarks to be made. 
First, by taking the UN Charter as the starting point, and constantly keep-
ing in mind the setup of the UN throughout its argumentation, the CFI’s rea-
soning is aimed at enabling maximum compliance of both the EU and the
Member States with the Charter. The CFI applied the relevant provisions, es-
pecially the ‘synergy of Articles 25 and 103’,18 on the primacy (in interna-
tional law) of the UN Charter and binding decisions taken in accordance with
it in a very straightforward manner, not diverting from established public in-
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15 Case T-315/01 Kadi, op.cit., par.178–208.
16 Ibidem, par. 209–232.
17 Ibidem, par. 233–292.
18 W. Reismann, The Constitutional Crisis of the United Nations, “American Journal of In-
ternational Law” Vol. 87, No. 1/1993, p. 93.
ternational law doctrine.19 This can be seen as consistent with the tradition-
ally international law friendly attitude of the European Courts, recognising
‘that the European Community must respect international law in the exercise
of its powers’.20 It is here that the ‘Völkerrechtfreundlichkeit’21 (‘friendly at-
titude towards international law’) of the judgment manifests itself most clearly
and most uncontroversially. Most importantly, it sets the UN Charter apart
from other international agreements, and therefore appreciates its special char-
acter as a global quasi-constitutional document.22
Following up on that, it is to be welcomed that the CFI underscored the
wide discretionary power the Security Council wields in the exercise of its
mandate. One should not forget that ‘an integral element of the rule of law
[is also] not to push judicial review beyond the limitations which restrict its
jurisdiction’23 and that ‘[t]o assess whether a threat to international peace
an security exists is indeed essentially a discretionary decision’24 requiring
‘a considerable margin of appreciation in determining a state of emergency
[...] and the measures required to deal with the situation’.25 These measures,
as is evident from the Charter, can even lead to a derogation from the gen-
eral prohibition to use force in international relations,26 entailing not only mil-
itary but also considerable numbers of civilian casualties.27
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19 C. Tomuschat, European Court of First Instance, op.cit., p. 541; see also R.Bernhardt, Art.
103 in: The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, eds. B.Simma et al., 2nd edition,
Oxford 2002, Vol. 2, p. 1294–1302. 
20 Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-06019, par. 9; see also: Case
104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 03641; and Case 181–73 Haegeman [1974] ECR 00449.
21 I. Ley, op.cit., p. 285.
22 On the constitutional quality of the UN Charter see e.g. B.Fassbender, Rediscovering a For-
gotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the UN Charter in the International Legal Order in:
Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, eds. J.Dun-
hoff and J. Trachtman, Cambridge 2009, p. 133–147; T. Franck, Is the UN Charter a Constitu-
tion? in: Verhandeln für den Frieden / Negotiating for Peace: Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel, eds.
Jochen Frowein et al., Berlin 2003, p. 95–106; and P.-M.Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension
of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited, “Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law”
Vol. 1/1997, p. 1–33. 
23 C. Tomuschat, European Court of First Instance, op.cit., p. 544.
24 Ibidem, p. 545. 
25 M. Karayigit, The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments: The Scope of the EC Competences in Re-
spect of Restrictive Measures, “Legal issues of Economic Integration” Vol. 33, No. 4/2006, p.398.
26 UN Charter, Art. 2, par. 4; note also legitimate self-defence as the only other exception,
Art. 51. 
27 See S.Alber, op.cit., p. 16; and C. Tomuschat, Die Europäische Union und ihre völker-
rechtliche Bindung (The Bindingness of International Law on the European Union), “Europäische
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift” Vol. 34, No. 1/2007, p. 7. 
Secondly, however, the caveat that has to follow immediately after this
point is the question whether there is any form of restraint of the Security
Council that could be exercised by the European Courts. As it has been for-
mulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in the Tadić case, as an organ of an international organisation, ‘[t]he
Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, how-
ever broad its powers under the constitution [i.e. the UN Charter] may be.’28
The Tribunal, itself a creation of the Security Council, consequently ruled
that ‘[i]n any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of
the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)’.29 Indeed, accord-
ing to the UN Charter, the Security Council has to act ‘in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’30 in carrying out its man-
date, which can be expected to ‘include norms that have been subsequently
treated as jus cogens’.31 The CFI used this limitation of the Security Coun-
cil’s discretion to introduce its own jus cogens standard for review. Heralded
by some as ‘[t]he strongest argument in favour of limitations on the powers
of the Security Council’,32 it is also the most controversial one. To begin with,
even though the existence of a body of peremptory norms as such seems less
and less disputed in international law and finds a strong basis in Article 53
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), there is no clear
delimitation between the rules that actually constitute jus cogens and those
that do not.33 In any case, more or less undisputed appear to be the prohibi-
tion of aggression, slavery, genocide, torture, piracy as well as the right to
self-defence and the respect for elementary human rights and norms of in-
ternational humanitarian law.34 In view of the uncertainty surrounding the sub-
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28 Case IT-94-1-I Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Ap-
peal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, par. 28.
29 Ibidem.
30 UN Charter, Art. 24, par. 2. 
31 Report of the International Law Commission, Official Records, Sixty-first Session, Sup-
plement No. 10 (A/61/10), 2006, p. 422.
32 See: A. Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Regime:
Violating Human Rights, “Berkeley Journal of International Law” Vol. 25, No. 2/2007, p. 212. 
33 International scholarship is virtually unanimous in agreeing that here is no consolidated
agreement on the scope of jus cogens yet, see e.g. P. Tavernier, L’identification des règles fon-
damentales, un problème résolu? (The Identification of Fundamental Rules, a solved problem?)
in: The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga
Omnes, eds. C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin, Leiden 2006, p. 1; P.-M.Dupuy, Droit interna-
tional public (Public International Law), 7th edition, Paris 2004, p. 285; I. Brownlie, Principles
of Public International Law, 6th edition, Oxford 2003, p. 490.
34 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Ex-
pansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission
finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, par. 374–376.
ject, the CFI thus trod on thin ice when it boldly embarked on reviewing in-
directly UN Security Council resolutions under its very own notion of what
this jus cogens should be. 
Nevertheless, the result might have been more acceptable if the assess-
ment had been done thoroughly and in accordance with the VCLT, i.e.
 determining for each right whether it is ‘accepted and recognized by the in-
ternational community of States as a whole’35 as being of a peremptory char-
acter. The CFI, however, did nothing of this kind. Instead, it simply referred
to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the le-
gality of nuclear weapons,36 which does not mention jus cogens at all, but in-
stead deals with the customary law status of certain core parts of international
humanitarian law.37
From this flawed starting point, the CFI proceeded to the different human
rights breaches alleged by the applicant. Concerning the right to property, in-
stead of relying on the International Covenants on Human Rights, the CFI
only referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which can also
be described as an ‘abortive’38 approach. More importantly, however, despite
its claim only to review the challenged acts by a standard of whatever it un-
derstands to be jus cogens the CFI went ‘much further in its examination than
would correspond to the premises which it adopted as guidance’.39 Concerning
the applicant’s other two claims ‘the Court does not even make an attempt to
show that [these] right[s] have the nature of jus cogens’,40 but simply reverts
to ECJ41 and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law.42
Under such circumstances, one could question whether the CFI acting as
a friend of international law is indeed beneficial to international law. In any
case, one has to agree with van den Herik that the CFI’s reasoning ‘adds to
the argument that national and regional courts are in fact not the proper place
for the review of Security Council measures’.43 Given the imprecise bound-
aries of jus cogens, such an argument is prone to abuse by other (less inde-
pendent) courts among UN members to find a justification to escape fulfil-
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35 VCLT, Art. 53.
36 Case T-315/01 Kadi, op.cit., par. 231.
37 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ
Reports 1996, p. 226, par. 79.
38 C. Tomuschat, European Court of First Instance, op.cit., p. 547.
39 Ibidem, p. 548.
40 Ibidem, p. 549.
41 Case T-315/01 Kadi, op.cit., par. 255.
42 Ibidem, par. 287.
43 L. van den Herik, The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better
Protection of the Individual, “Leiden Journal of International Law” Vol. 20, No. 4/2007, p. 801
(emphasis in the original). 
ment of their obligation in the collective effort to combat international ter-
rorism and thus could create loopholes and safe havens for terrorists.44 Fur-
thermore, if various domestic and regional courts started applying their very
own jus cogens, this would lead to the proliferation of notions of what con-
stitutes the absolute core of international law, leading to the fragmentation of
international law. 
Thirdly, notwithstanding its questionable application of jus cogens, the
fiercest criticism has to be directed at the actual result of the judgment, namely
that the applicant’s claims were dismissed altogether, therefore refusing him
legal protection against the sanctions which obviously had grave consequences
for his life.45 From this perspective, it has to be conceded that the CFI’s seem-
ingly friendly attitude towards international law came at a very high price,
namely sacrificing the protection of human rights as guaranteed by the EU
legal order, from which the applicants in e.g. in the Organisation des Mod-
jahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI)46 cases had fully benefited due to a less
direct link between the Community measures and Security Council resolu-
tions (so-called ‘non-autonomous sanctions’, where UN members enjoy a cer-
tain margin of appreciation in terms of implementation). 
In sum, contrasting this sacrifice with a closer look at what has actually
been won, namely a questionable and ‘adventurous’47 application of interna-
tional law leading to a quasi-‘submission’48 of the EU legal order to a de facto
unaccountable Security Council, evidently begs the question: Is this really
worth it? In any case, against such a backdrop, the temptation to choose
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44 See: C. Möllers, Der EuG konstitutionalisiert die Vereinten Nationen: Anmerkung zu den
Urteilen des EuG vom 21.09.2005, Rs. T-315/01 und T-315/01 (The CFI Constitutionalizes the
United Nations: Note on the CFI Judgments of 21 September 2005), “Europarecht” Vol. 41,
No. 3/2006, p. 428.
45 See: C. Eckes, Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures – The Yusuf and
Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance, “European Law Journal” Vol. 14, No. 1/2008,
p. 92. Due process deficiencies at the UN level had also spawned a number of high-level re-
ports, see I. Cameron, The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United
Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Report commissioned by the Council
of Europe, 06.02.2006.; B.Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process, Study commis-
sioned by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 20.03.2006; and T. Bierstecker and S. Eck-
ert, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures, White Paper pre-
pared by the Watson Institute Targeted Sanctions Project, Brown University, 30.03.2006.
46 Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council [2006] ECR
II-04665.
47 J.D’Aspremont and F. Dopagne, Kadi: The ECJ’s Reminder of the Elementary Divide
between Legal Orders, “International Organization Law Review” Vol. 5, No. 2/2008, p. 378.
48 ‘Unterordnung’, K. Schmalenbach, Normentheorie vs. Terrorismus: Der Vorrang des UN-
Rechts vor EU-Recht (Norm Theory vs. Terrorism: The Primacy of UN Law over EU Law), “Ju-
ristenzeitung” Vol. 61, No. 7/2006, p. 352.
 another solution that pays less attention to obligations under international
law and doing more to protect the internal values of the EU becomes con-
siderable.
1.2. Advocate General Poiares Maduro: Outsourcing the problem?
This temptation to seek a more fundamental rights-friendly solution seems
also to have motivated AG Poiares Maduro’s reasoning in the Opinion he de-
livered on 16 January 2008 concerning Mr Kadi’s appeal. In contrast to the
CFI, the Advocate General chose as his argumentative starting point the (then)
EC legal order, stressing its autonomy.49 This led to an argumentation based
on the superior protection of the individual in the EC legal order.50 This in
turn resulted in the detection of several breaches of fundamental rights by the
EC acts implementing the sanctions, which should accordingly be annulled.51
In the following appraisal, it will be pointed out that while the Opinion is
consistent in itself, it theoretically risks leading to the isolation of the EC
legal order and ultimately to an outsourcing of the problem.
The way international law has been treated by AG Poiares Maduro in the
Kadi case differs fundamentally from the CFI’s approach, with the most ob-
vious difference being that the AG spends far fewer words on it. His argu-
ment remains, most of the time, firmly within the realms of EU law. How-
ever, also this silence on the matter is quite revealing of the way he conceives
of the relationship between international and European law. Three main ob-
servations are to be made in this respect. 
First, as has been pointed out, the fundament of AG Poiares Maduro’s ar-
gument is the autonomy of the EC legal order. He kept stressing throughout
that it was even a so-called ‘municipal legal order’.52 Thus, even though ‘[t]his
does not mean, however, that the Community’s legal order and the interna-
tional legal order pass by each other like ships in the night’,53 in his view,
the Court’s duty ‘first and foremost, is to preserve the constitutional frame-
work of the [EC] Treaty’.54
This can be seen as the latest of several steps in EU jurisprudence of sev-
ering the Union legal order from the international one from which it origi-
nated. The formulation of ‘a new legal order of international law’55 in van
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49 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, Opinion of AG Poiares
Maduro, op.cit., par. 21–24.
50 Ibidem, par. 25–40.
51 Ibidem, par. 41–55.
52 Ibidem, par. 21, 22, 23, 37 and 39.
53 Ibidem, par. 22.
54 Ibidem, par. 24.
55 Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos [1962] ECR (English special edition) 00001, par. 9.
Gend en Loos still gave the impression that it formed part of public interna-
tional law. But only shortly thereafter, the judgment in Costa v ENEL estab-
lished a trend more towards something resembling a domestic legal order by
stressing that ‘[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the
treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and
which their courts are bound to apply’.56 Eventually, the ECJ started refer-
ring to the EC Treaty as the ‘basic constitutional charter’57 of the Commu-
nity legal order. Also European law scholars concluded that in spite of its ori-
gins in public international law, EC law had emancipated into an autonomous
legal order,58 a quality the ECJ was ‘particularly insistent on defending’.59
With regard to the effects of international law therein, it has been observed
that this stance strongly resonates the German bridge metaphor attributed to
justice Paul Kirchof, whereby ‘judges operating within the putatively closed
entity have the function of guards deciding whether or not a legal act from
a foreign power may pass’,60 with the guard ‘exclusively apply[ing] his own
standards’.61
However, one cannot help to develop some degree of suspicion vis-à-vis
this over-emphasising of the EC’s legal autonomy. Even tough not the focus
of the discussion here, the difficult task the Council, Commission, CFI and
AG encountered in finding some ‘Magic Mixture’62 of articles as a legal basis
for (then) EC competence to implement targeted sanctions is telling: At one
point always elements form the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP) pillar came into play.63 The circumstance that ‘even when
acting within the scope of the CFSP, the Member States must respect EC law’64
does not offer much consolation, seeing that the CFSP is excluded from the
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56 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR (English special edition) 00614, par. 8. 
57 Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 01339, par. 23. 
58 See e.g. M. Herdegen, Europarecht (European Law), 6th edition, Munich 2004, p. 68. 
59 P. Craig and G.de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edition, Oxford 2008,
p.202.
60 M. Nettesheim, U.N. Sanctions Against Individuals – A Challenge to the Architecture of
European Union Governance, “Common Market Law Review” Vol. 44, No. 3/2007, p. 580. 
61 Ibidem. 
62 Referring to the CFI’s judgment, C. Eckes, Judicial Review..., op.cit., p. 79; see in detail
on the issue M. Cremona, EC Competence, ‘Smart Sanctions’ and the Kadi Case, “Yearbook of
European Law” Vol. 28/2009, p. 559–592.
63 Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415-05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., par. 158–236, es-
pecially par. 226; Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, Opinion of
AG Poiares Maduro, op.cit., par. 11–15; Case T-315/01 Kadi, op.cit., par. 64–135. 
64 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, op.cit., p. 190; based on Case C-124/95 Centro-Com [1997] ECR
I-00081, par. 25.
ECJ’s jurisdiction,65 and thus evidently did not quite constitute a ‘complete
system of judicial protection’66 at that time. Besides that, the fact that any
amendment of such a ‘constitutional charter’ has to be made by unanimous
decision of the Member States acting as the seigneurs des traités also serves
as an indication that this ‘legal order [was] still dominated by the spirit of
international law’67 to a certain extent. Lastly, what also fits uneasily with
this ‘municipal’ quality of EC law is the fact that e.g. the German Constitu-
tional Court through its Solange-II ruling still reserves the right to review
Community acts should the EC cease to exercise a materially equivalent de-
gree of fundamental rights protection.68 Therefore, the conclusion that the legal
effects of review will remain confined to the EC, while the law of treaties
and state responsibility will deal with the outside world, might be too black-
and-white a depiction for two legal orders with an undeniable grey area still
between them.
Secondly, however, introducing the Solange jurisprudence of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the discussion of the way Kadi was approached
by AG Poiares Maduro also reveals one of its greatest merits. It is important
to note that even though the German Constitutional Court in Solange-II did not
relinquish its right of review, it decided to refrain from exercising it for as long
as the EU legal order maintained a level of protection that it deemed appro-
priate.69 Essentially the same argument was used in the judgment of the ECtHR
in Bosphorus, stating that measures taken to comply with international obliga-
tions such as UN sanctions are ‘justified as long as the relevant organisation
is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guar-
antees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the [European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] provides’.70 But accepting an external
protection standard requires a ‘leap of faith’71 by the reviewing instance de-
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sisting from the ordinary conduct of its mandate. However, the ECtHR also
ruled that ‘any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a
particular case, it is considered that the protection of [ECHR] rights was man-
ifestly deficient’.72 AG Poiares Maduro indeed hinted at the possibility of ‘solang-
ing’ the issue by suggesting at the end of his Opinion that if there ‘had been a
genuine and effective mechanism of judicial control by an independent tribu-
nal at the level of the United Nations, then this might have released the Com-
munity from the obligation to provide for judicial control’.73 But there is no
denying that with the ICJ not being accessible to individuals74 (and generally
somewhat reluctant when it comes to ‘[s]econd-[g]uessing the Security Coun-
cil’)75 and the Security Council itself still only providing ‘a purely political mech-
anism’76 for review, there is no judicial remedy whatsoever available at the UN
level. Therefore, there is a point in saying that the UN does not (yet) deserve
such a leap of faith.77 Thus, when construing it as a clear-cut ‘choice between
a fully developed legal system for the protection of individual rights, [and] an
embryonic system ill-equipped to deal with instances of direct individual griev-
ances’,78 AG Poiares Maduro undoubtedly made the right choice. For him the
Kadi case is in no way more special than for instance OMPI. From a purely
EU law point of view, this choice prevents external interference from corrod-
ing a more deeply integrated legal system. From a human rights point of view,
it shifts the balance from international security concerns to the protection of
the individual. Even though the AG does not claim to review the UNSC reso-
lutions as such, at least adversely affected individuals can seek remedies at the
regional/domestic level against the implementing measures. 
This unequivocal choice by the Advocate General in favour of the EU’s
legal autonomy and its more sophisticated human rights protection also leads
to the third observation. Instead of simplifying the problem,79 it is argued here
that it instead defers the problem to another level, by letting public interna-
tional law deal with the ulterior ‘repercussions’80 of the AG’s argumentation.
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Had the ECJ indeed annulled the contested regulation as far as it concerned
Mr Kadi, his assets would have been unfrozen and the travel ban lifted. How-
ever, he (and others who would have successfully challenged EU measures)
would remain on the Security Council’s list, with the EU Member States being
barred from implementing the sanctions individually.81 This might not only
‘inconvenience the Community and its Member States in their dealings on
the international stage’,82 as the AG put it, but would amount to nothing less
than forcing 27 UN member states to violate their obligations under the UN
Charter. With the Security Council stressing that targeted sanctions represent
‘a significant tool in combating terrorist activity’83 and calling for their ‘ro-
bust implementation’,84 this could be seen as an indication that non-compli-
ance is not a petty offence. 
It may be defensible to argue that it is up to the parties how to live up to
their international obligations internally, with failure to comply again being
regulated by international law (state responsibility or special rules).85 How-
ever, the Advocate General fails to acknowledge here the special nature of
the United Nations in the sector of international security, which cannot be
dealt with just like any organisation.86 In addition, he does not address the
lack of room for manoeuvrability in the present case. Be it justified or not,
there is no changing the fact that in the Kadi case the Union and the Mem-
ber States do simply not have any leeway when implementing the sanctions
from a UN perspective. In this case the EU is indeed just the ‘transmission
belt’87 of the Security Council. Hence, unlike international trade under the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework, there are no alternative solu-
tions conceivable such as ‘payment of compensation or suspension of con-
cessions’.88 In the realm of international security, such options would be plainly
absurd. 
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Lastly, even though such judicially forced non-compliance would in AG
Poiares Maduro’s reasoning not lead to the fragmentation of international law
(what is not applied cannot be fragmented), the danger for abuse remains just
as with the CFI’s application of jus cogens. If the AG’s approach would be
followed by other courts, they would not even have (to pretend) to apply a uni-
versal standard. Instead, it would be every UN member state’s respective con-
stitutional values that could serve as an excuse for escaping Chapter VII ob-
ligations, which could prove to be quite an ‘explosive force’ for the UN
architecture.89
In sum, we have thus seen that also AG Poiares Maduro’s approach, de-
spite its obvious merits, comes at a price. While the CFI was eventually qual-
ified as a false friend of international law, the Advocate General could be de-
scribed as an honest sceptic of the international legal order. But while he is
safeguarding the applicant’s fundamental rights and preserving the autonomy
of the EU legal order, he sacrifices in principle the commitment of 27 UN
members to the UN’s system of collective security. 
2. Squaring the circle: The international ramifications
of the ECJ judgment
On 3 September 2008, the ECJ pronounced its anxiously awaited judg-
ment in the case, largely following the AG’s Opinion—with some significant
differences, however. First, (unsurprisingly) the starting point of the ECJ is
also the autonomy of the EC legal order as ‘a complete system of legal reme-
dies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the le-
gality of acts of the institutions’.90 It hereby follows the AG’s dualist approach,
pointing out that what is being reviewed are EU acts, and not the UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions as such. However, it is remarkable that while explaining
this, the Court makes the effort of emphasising the importance of international
law and in particular of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.91 This does eventu-
ally give flesh to the AG’s statements that the EU is ‘beholden to’92 interna-
tional law and that the two legal orders do indeed not ‘pass by each other like
ships in the night’.93 From this follows, as in the AG’s Opinion, that UN Char-
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ter obligations, despite their overriding importance in the sphere of interna-
tional law, cannot change the hierarchy of norms within the Union’s legal order,
with the treaties and the fundamental principles enshrined therein at the top.94
Again, it is to be noted that the Court nonetheless dwells in its reasoning both
on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as well as the changes that have been ef-
fected at the UN level to improve the targeted sanctions regime, like the re-
quirement to provide information to the listed individual and the possibility
to individually petition for re-examination of their case.95 The ECJ thus shows
that stressing the autonomy of its own legal order does not have to entail ig-
noring whatever is happening outside of it. As a result, it states that under the
present circumstances, a full review of the implementation measures against
Union law would be called for, and dismisses (probably to the relief of many
public international law scholars) the CFI’s venture into its own jus cogens
review. According to this standard of review, it goes on to detect infringements
of the right to be heard, the right to effective judicial review and, resulting
from these procedural deficiencies, also the right to respect for property.96 Fi-
nally, also at this stage of its reasoning, the ECJ demonstrates awareness of
the wider context, e.g. the necessity of a ‘surprise effect’ of targeted sanctions
in order to prevent circumvention,97 or the need to strike a ‘fair balance’ be-
tween the public interest in effectively combating terrorism on a global scale
and the individual interest to have one’s property respected.98
It is also these considerations that prompt the Court in the final part of its
reasoning to depart from the AG’s Opinion. The Court recognizes that the im-
mediate annulment of the regulation with respect to the applications ‘would be
capable of seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness of the restrictive
measures [...] because in the interval preceding its replacement by a new regu-
lation Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat might take steps seeking to prevent measures
freezing funds from being applied to them again’.99 Furthermore, notwithstand-
163
J.Larik, The Kadi Judgment and the Treaty of Lisbon
94 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit. par. 281. For an ar-
gument that the Kadi judgment even elevated the position of fundamental rights within the EU
legal order’s hierarchy of norms, see N. Isiksel, Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and
Al Barakaat, “European Law Journal” Vol. 16, No. 5/2010, p. 571–577.
95 Ibidem, par. 310–325; see also UN Security Council Resolution 1735/2006, S/Res/1735
(2006), 22 December 2006; and the UNSC Sanction Committee’s guidelines, the latest version
being: UN Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Con-
cerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, Guidelines of the
Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, adopted on 7 November 2002, as amended on 10 April
2003, 21 December 2005, 29 November 2006, 12 February 2007, and 9 December 2008.
96 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., par. 331–372. 
97 Ibidem, par. 340.
98 Ibidem, par. 360.
99 Ibidem, par. 373.
ing the infringements against the applicants, the ECJ underlines also that ‘it can-
not be excluded that, on the merits of the case, the imposition of those measures
on the appellants may for all that prove to be justified’.100 Therefore, by virtue
of Article 231 TEC (now Article 264 TFEU), the Court ruled that the effects of
the measures should be maintained for three months, allowing the Union insti-
tutions to bring the implementing measures in line with EU law.101
In response to the judgment, on 28 November 2008, Commission Regula-
tion 1190/2008 was adopted, stating that ‘the Commission has communicated
the narrative summaries of reasons provided by the UN Al-Qaida and Taliban
Sanctions Committee, to Mr Kadi and to Al Barakaat International Founda-
tion and given them the opportunity to comment on these grounds in order to
make their point of view known’.102 After having received and considered such
comments, the Commission ruled that the listing of Mr Kadi (and Al Barakaat)
was justified due to association with Al-Qaida and that he should be (re-)added
to the list. The regulation entered into force exactly three months after the ECJ
judgment was pronounced. Thereupon, Mr Kadi challenged the new regulation
before that General Court, which rendered its judgment on 30 September 2010
following an expedited procedure. The GC followed – even though grudgingly103
– the guidelines adopted by the ECJ, concluding that it has to ‘ensure [...] “in
principle the full review” of the lawfulness of the contested regulation in the
light of fundamental rights’.104 Regarding the Commission’s compliance meas-
ures mentioned above, and in view of the fact that no actual evidence had been
produced thus far before the Court by the institutions justifying Mr Kadi’s list-
ing, the GC ruled that ‘the applicant’s rights of defence have been “observed”
only in the most formal and superficial sense’.105 Given that the new regula-
tion was also in breach of the applicant’s fundamental rights, the GC decided
that it, too, had to be annulled so far as it concerns Mr Kadi.106 However, the
annulment will only take effect after a two-month period, or in case of an un-
successful appeal. That means he still remains on the list.
While from an EU law point of view the ECJ’s judgment is undoubtedly
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to be welcomed, let us now turn to the ramifications it can be expected to
produce on the international scene. Two observations are to be made in this
respect, one for the short-term and one for the long-term.
Firstly, for the time being, the ECJ’s judgment managed to square the cir-
cle, or otherwise put, to take the best of two worlds: It adopted the AG’s legally
stringent reasoning, but by virtue of the temporary continuation of the effects
of the measures, it maintains also compliance with international obligations.
That means that the EU and its Member States continue to fulfil their obli-
gations under the UN Charter, and thus would have nothing to fear from the
UNSC. This continued compliance, combined with the sensitivity the ECJ
showed in its reasoning for developments on the international scene, should
not be underestimated. Taking this into account, it would seem exaggerated
to derive from the judgment the impression that the ECJ, or more generally
the EU, ‘has adopted a largely instrumentalist and self-serving approach’,107
which would be not so ‘different from the US in its hard-headed, pick-and-
choose attitude to international obligations’.108
As a result, however, Mr Kadi has remained the subject of restrictive meas-
ures directed against him. Assuming that he would seek, next to the EU Courts,
other legal remedies still open to him, he might either bring the matter be-
fore a national judge (in the EU) or the ECtHR. The former, however, is a
very unpromising option, as he would first have to find a court willing to
judge upon a matter just adjudicated by, and again pending before the EU
courts. This would presuppose a downward ‘solanging’, a possibility at least
theoretically present in Germany according to the Solange-II judgment. But
in view of the unlikelihood of this case (and others) actually making it all the
way up to that court, as well as the unlikely willingness of the Bunderver-
fassungsgericht or other Member State courts to challenge both the ECJ and
the UNSC, this does not appear as a viable option.109
As for the latter, it is not excluded that the applicant eventually will con-
tinue his case against EU Member States before the ECtHR as the ‘fourth in-
stance’,110 just as the applicant did in Bosphorus. This upward ‘solanging’ is
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not entirely unrealistic and unpromising, because the ECtHR explicitly stated
in its Bosphorus judgment that it would be prepared to step in as soon as
human rights protection elsewhere proved to be ‘manifestly deficient’.111 Then
again, taking into account the ECtHR’s decision on Behrami and Saramati,
where that court showed a large degree of deference towards the UN, ren-
ders the prospects of success for a challenge more questionable.112 However,
as long as the case is pending before the EU Courts, it is unlikely that the
ECtHR would intervene.113 In fact, in order to prevent so-called upward or
downward ‘solanging’, what the ECJ is actually doing could be described as
temporal ‘solanging’, or simply procrastinating the problem.
This in turn brings us to the second observation: What if ultimately the
ECJ were to remove Mr Kadi due to procedural defaults? Given the em-
phasis put by the GC on the lack of evidence as well as the long time
Mr Kadi has been subject to restrictive measures,114 this question has be-
come increasingly pressing. Even though the ECJ makes sure that it does
not review UN Security Council Resolutions as such, the concern remains
that this could eventually lead to the collective non-compliance of 27 UN
members, given the temporary nature of the continuation of the effects of
the measures and given that the subsequent measures have again been suc-
cessfully challenged. 
However, the real consequences of annulment and delisting, and thus non-
compliance with UN Charter obligations would not be as shocking as they
may appear. As AG Poiares Maduro put it, legal challenges against the ef-
fects of such resolutions ‘cannot be entirely unexpected on the Security Coun-
cil’s part’.115 Indeed, already in a report from 2005 the UNSC Sanction Com-
mittee’s Monitoring Team acknowledged that unless something was done to
improve the sanctions regime, there was ‘the possibility of one or more po-
tentially negative court decisions that could hamper enforcement efforts’.116
Consequently, in its report from 2007, the Monitoring Team had discovered
no fewer than 26 cases before domestic courts around the world dealing
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with such challenges.117 Against this backdrop, the ECJ is likely to have
had a significant announcement effect. In 2008, the Monitoring Team itself
stated that the adoption of the AG’s position by the ECJ would create a ‘prece-
dent’.118 According to the report, ‘there is a real possibility that the regula-
tion used by the 27 member States of the European Union to implement
the sanctions will be held invalid’119 which could ‘trigger similar challenges
that could quickly erode enforcement’,120 also in ‘other States outside the
European Union’.121 In its 2009 report, the Monitoring Team indeed took
note of the ‘long awaited decision’122 of the ECJ, calling it ‘arguably the
most significant legal development to affect the regime since its inception’.123
It is also anxiously observing its aftermath, stating that ‘[w]hen the process
of judgment and appeal [concerning Mr Kadi’s new challenge] is completed,
the resulting decision [...] has the potential to create significant difficulties
for all member States of the European Union and may alter the terms of
the wider discussion of the fairness of the regime and the need for reform’124
of the UNSC sanctions regime. Thus, just as the ECJ demonstrated aware-
ness of what is going on outside of the EU, the UNSC seems to be follow-
ing equally closely what is happening inside of the EU. In view of this,
one could qualify the Kadi judgment as an example of what Bronckers calls
a ‘muted dialogue’ between institutions on the international and domestic
levels.125
In any event, politically speaking, the French and British vetoes in the
Council would most likely prevent the EU and its members from facing any
sanctions themselves in case of non-compliance with the sanctions regime
resulting from an ECJ judgment. Moreover, the ECJ’s judgment and any fu-
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ture judgments of this kind might be beneficial to the UN in the sense that
additional pressure on the Security Council would contribute to the estab-
lishment of more transparent and fair procedures. In fact, pressure on the Se-
curity Council to improve the targeted sanctions regime has been applied for
years now at the highest levels. For instance, already in 2004 the report of
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed the issue
of targeted sanctions and called for ‘procedures to review the cases of those
claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists’.126 In 2005,
the UN World Summit outcome document urged ‘the Security Council, [...]
to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and en-
tities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting hu-
manitarian exemptions’.127 One year later the Legal Counsel at the UN Sec-
retariat commissioned an in-depth study on ‘Targeted Sanctions and Due
Process’. This study concluded that the sanctions regime should ensure four
basic rights of listed persons, viz. the right to be informed about the meas-
ures taken against them, the right to be heard before the UNSC or the sanc-
tions committee, the right of legal counsel and representation, and the right
to an effective remedy before an independent body,128 basically matching what
the ECJ is demanding from the EU’s own institutions. Later the same year,
on 22 June 2006, the Security Council organised a special debate on
‘Strengthening international law: rule of law and maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security’, a central topic of which was improving the sanc-
tions regime.129 In this debate, the Legal Counsel of the UN reiterated the ne-
cessity to guarantee the four rights from the Fassbender study,130 and the
Austrian permanent representative to the UN, speaking on behalf of the EU,
underscored ‘the importance of upholding certain minimum standards to en-
sure fair and clear procedures when designing and implementing sanctions’131
in order to ‘preserve the legitimacy and reinforce the efficacy of the United
Nations sanctions regimes.’132 In a report from 2006, the UN Special Rap-
porteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering
terrorism Martin Scheinin pointed out that ‘if there is no proper or adequate
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international review available, national review procedures — even for inter-
national lists — are necessary’.133
These considerations at the international level explain the incremental
process of adaptation of the sanctions regime that has been going on in the
last years. Hence, it can safely be said that this ECJ judgment will not cause
the sudden and unprecedented demise of the international security architec-
ture. Still, it constitutes an important apex in a continuing back-and forth be-
tween the Security Council and critical voices regarding targeted sanctions
throughout the international community. In fact, also the concerns about other
countries imitating the ECJ’s assumed defiance of the Security Council can
be reinterpreted in a more positive way, as they ultimately contribute to ad-
ditional constructive pressure on the UN.
In sum, in the long run, the EU and its Member States would have no di-
rect adverse ramifications to fear from a definitive annulment of the meas-
ures in question, while saving at the same time their credibility regarding
human rights protection. However, there is a real risk that this might spark
(more) imitation by other courts outside of the EU. Then again, this would
only contribute to increasing the pressure on the Security Council to amend
its procedures, which is to be welcomed. 
But the question that directly ensues from this is: What could we then
realistically expect the Security Council to do in order to provide for im-
proved human rights protection at the UN level? As the listing and de-list-
ing procedure stands, three of the four rights claimed by Fassbender and the
UN Legal Counsel are lived up to. However, as the Sanctions Committee’s
Monitoring Team points out itself, ‘one major issue remains: the suggestion
that listing decisions by the Committee be subject to review by an independent
panel’.134 According to the team, the prospect of ‘any panel having more
than an advisory role’135 is unrealistic. Thus, while legally the setting-up of
a special tribunal would not be a problem,136 it seems highly unlikely that
the Security Council would establish a tribunal directed against its own ac-
tions. Furthermore, quite convincing practical arguments militate against such
a permanent body. As Tomuschat argues, it would be quite paradoxical in-
deed to grant terror suspects around the world who have been subject to
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a travel ban free flights to New York or The Hague to plead their case be-
fore a special tribunal.137
Against this backdrop, even though the generally preferable solution is to
be sought at the UN level, optimism for radical change should remain limited.
In view of the particular complexity of the issue and the jealously guarded pre-
rogatives of the Security Council, the right to judicial review seems to be only
approachable in an asymptotical manner, i.e. by striving for something as closely
resembling a tribunal as possible without being one. In this context, the sug-
gestion to install ‘panels of wise men (or women)’138 or the office of ‘an inde-
pendent Ombudsman’139 (which was established at the end of 2009)140 with mere
advisory power, but bearing political and public authority, seems to be the most
viable option, which at the end of the day remain the most effective, albeit not
judicial remedies.141 As the GC confirmed in its latest Kadi judgment, however,
the possibility to turn to an Ombudsperson does not solve the problems in terms
of judicial review and access to documents in terms of EU law.142
Finally, the Security Council could easily rid itself of the problem by sim-
ply relying more on (semi-)autonomous sanctions, i.e. by retaining its lists, but
leaving it up to each UN member state’s judiciary to review the implementation
measures taken by its respective executive branch. As the Sanctions Commit-
tee’s Monitoring Teams point out in this regard, ‘[t]he authority of the Council
will be far more fundamentally affected if States are unable to implement its de-
cisions without violating their own laws’.143 Following the ECJ’s lead, national
(or supranational) judicial mechanisms would ensure that this would not occur.
Should the Security Council find that a state abuses this freedom, or have doubts
as to the independence of its judiciary, it could still apply sanctions to either that
state or the person concerned. Otherwise put, though the EU human rights stan-
dard cannot be transposed to the UN level (yet), another European specialty, the
principle of subsidiarity, might prove helpful in this regard. 
3. Foreshadowing the Lisbon Treaty
Having concluded that the ECJ found an on the whole very satisfactory
solution to the Kadi conundrum, let us now take a look at the changes intro-
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duced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009,
and at the extent to which these modifications clarify the issues the Court had
to deal with. Even though there have been complaints about there being ‘too
much’ constitutional law introduced by Lisbon in the area of external rela-
tions,144 it will be submitted here that at least with respect to targeted sanc-
tions and the relationship with the UN, the Lisbon reform contains a number
of useful additions. 
First of all, the problem concerning lack of competence for adopting sanc-
tions also against entities other than states has been solved. The pillar struc-
ture has been formally disbanded and replaced with the single legal entity of
the EU,145 and a new provision has been added explicitly allowing restrictive
measures ‘against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities’.146
Also, the successor to Article 60 TEC on capital movement restrictions has
been reframed for the purpose of ‘preventing and combating terrorism’.147
However, the adoption of sanctions as such remains a disguised ‘cross-pil-
lar’ exercise, requiring first a CFSP ‘decision’, generally taken by unanim-
ity.148
The most striking feature, however, can be found in paragraph 3 of Arti-
cles 215 and 75 TFEU respectively, stipulating that restrictive measures
adopted under Lisbon ‘shall include necessary provisions on legal safe-
guards.’149 This would cater to AG Maduro’s reasoning, by turning the right
to judicial review from a general principle of EU law to an explicit Treaty
provision on which applicants could directly base their claim. In addition,
notwithstanding a general exclusion of ECJ jurisdiction in CFSP matters, the
Court has been granted competence to asses whether such safeguards are in-
deed provided for, since there is an exception for ‘proceedings, brought in
accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article
263 of this Treaty [ex-Article 230 TEC], reviewing the legality of decisions
providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted
by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European
Union [CFSP]’.150
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It should also be mentioned that the duty of loyal cooperation between
Member States at the Security Council has been strengthened. Under the old
TEU, only permanent members (i.e. France and the UK) have to ‘ensure the
defence of the positions and the interests of the Union’151 with other EU mem-
bers just having to ‘concert’.152 Now all EU members at the UNSC would be
obliged to ‘defend the positions and the interests of the Union’.153 However,
the qualification to exercise this duty ‘without prejudice to their responsibil-
ities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter’ remains154 leaves
the door open for well-known justifications about the prerogatives and dis-
cretionary powers of the UNSC.
On a more general level, the newly introduced provision on the external
objectives of the Union, to be found in Article 3, paragraph 5 TEU, also raises
the oft-discussed question of the relationship between international and Eu-
ropean law. There it is inter alia stated that ‘[i]n its relations with the wider
world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and con-
tribute to the protection of its citizens’155 and that ‘[i]t shall contribute to
peace, security, [...] the protection of human rights, [...] as well as to the strict
observance and the development of international law, including respect for
the principles of the United Nations Charter’.156 Looking back, this resonates
the essential message of the ECJ in Kadi. Also in the fight against interna-
tional terrorism, the Union is committed to contribute to international peace
and security, and acknowledges the special role of the UN in that area. How-
ever, such a contribution cannot be such as to undermine the EU’s own val-
ues, including fundamental rights and a complete system of legal remedies.
Yet, the ECJ’s circumspect move not to cast the EU and its Member States
offhand into a situation of non-compliance with international obligations is
indeed a contribution to ‘strict compliance’, while at the same time it also
points out areas where the international legal order is in need of ‘develop-
ment’, in this case concerning the protection of international human rights. 
In sum, the Lisbon Treaty certainly clarifies the situation in the internal
legal order of the EU. It can be strongly suspected that these changes were
deliberately framed for the purpose of addressing the current targeted sanc-
tions problematic. However, when following an inward looking reasoning such
as the AG’s in Kadi, the current state of EU law already was quite straight-
forward (safe the question of legal basis). Concerning the interrelatedness with
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international law and the UN Charter in particular, Article 3, paragraph 5 TEU
sets out the parameters of the Union’s commitment as well as the outer lim-
its of its willingness to comply with international obligations. 
Conclusion
In order to conclude, let us return to the point of departure of the analy-
sis. Were any of the extreme approaches proposed to solve Kadi to be pre-
ferred? That is, either the AG’s one where the international and European
spheres are depicted as two ships, albeit not passing by each other unnoticed,
but trying to avoid collision, yet remaining separate vessels sailing at differ-
ent speed; or rather the other of the CFI, where the international legal order
is conceived of as an all-embracing hulk, with the UNSC at the helm, leav-
ing us hoping that it will safely circumnavigate all the perils on the way.
The latter approach, from a modern, globalised perspective, appears more
appealing at first glance. But a closer look at the actual argumentation re-
vealed too many leaks, leaks that ultimately make the seaworthiness of this
giant ship questionable, while the hard-won achievement of effective human
rights protection is simply thrown overboard. On the contrary, while the AG’s
argumentation at first glance might seem a bit out-of-time, its legal conclu-
siveness, or ‘waterproofness’, at least keeps those on the European ship safe.
But then again, what about the other, the struggling ship flying the light-blue
flag of the UN?
The right balance was ultimately found by the ECJ, and ultimately ac-
cepted by the General Court, especially when taking into account the inter-
national ramifications which are likely to result, both in the short term and
in the long term. The fact that the ECJ largely foreshadowed constitutional
changes in this area introduced by the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates its fore-
sight and underpins this conclusion. In the end, the reality of the international
community and its imperfect institutions, in the face of common threats such
as international terrorism as well as human rights violations, rather paints the
picture of us all sitting in the same boat together after all. However, the le-
gitimate and productive pressure that the ECJ ruling created is tantamount to
a clear warning signal, still short of a mutiny, reminding the UNSC as the
over-steering helmsman of the international community to readjust the course
of this common enterprise as far as possible.
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